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Abstract. This collected volume gives a concise account of the most rel-
evant scientiﬁc results of the COST Action IS1104 “The EU in the new
complex geography of economic systems: models, tools and policy evalua-
tion”, a four-year project supported by COST (European Cooperation in
Science and Technology). It is divided into three parts reﬂecting the dif-
ferent perspectives under which complex spatial economic systems have
been studied: (i) the Macro perspective looks at the interactions among
international or regional trading partners; (ii) the Meso perspective con-
siders the functioning of (ﬁnancial, labour) markets as social network
structures; and, ﬁnally, (iii) the Micro perspective focuses on the strate-
gic choices of single ﬁrms and households. This Volume points also at
open issues to be addressed in future research.
Keywords: COST Action IS114 · European Union · Economic Geog-
raphy · Financial Markets · Strategic Decisions and Interactions · Com-
plexity
1 The COST Action IS1104 “The EU in the New
Complex Geography of Economic Systems: Models,
Tools and Policy Evaluation”
Inspired by the New Economic Geography (NEG) approach, initiated by Paul
Krugman and Masahita Fujita in the 1990s, the main objective of the COST
Action 1104 “The EU in the new complex geography of economic systems:
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models, tools and policy evaluation (GeComplexity)” has been to approach the
study of EU, more generally, economic systems from a multi-layered perspective
featuring interconnected spatial structures. At each layer, diﬀerent types of deci-
sions and interactions take place: interactions among international or regional
trading partners at the macro-level; the functioning of (ﬁnancial, labour) markets
as social network structures at the meso-level; and ﬁnally, the strategic choices of
single ﬁrms and households at the micro-level. Within these structures, the spa-
tial distribution of economic activities is evolving through time following complex
patterns determined by economic, geographical, institutional and social factors.
To study these structures, during its four years life time (March 2012–September
2016), the Action has built successfully an interdisciplinary approach. It has fur-
ther developed advanced mathematical, computational and empirical methods
and tools for analysing complex nonlinear systems, including macro and micro
models, nonlinear dynamical systems, social networks, game theoretical models
and agent based models.
This leads to the second objective of the Action: building multiregional mod-
els that integrate real world features; mapping the geography of the ﬁnancial and
banking networks; understanding ﬁrms’ strategic choices on location and R&D
cooperation and competition. More generally highlighting the pervasiveness of
networks structures at the various levels of aggregation.
To achieve these objectives, several activities have been performed. Twenty-
three meetings of which four major events – including a Final Conference – and
several workshops have taken place. Researches from twenty-six European coun-
tries and across the world and from an EU Commission research institution (the
Joint Research Centre, JRC, Seville) have contributed with an interdisciplinary
expertise: economists, regional economists, applied economists, mathematicians,
physicists. These activities lead to several scientiﬁc outcomes including more
than 140 articles in leading journals, Special Issues (four published and two as
an expected outcome of the Final Conference), three collected volumes, multiple
book chapters and working papers.
The Action has evolved into a very active network not only through several
meetings but also via more than eighty Short Term Scientiﬁc Missions (STSMs).
A high percentage of STSMs have been allocated to Early Stage Researchers
(ESRs). Moreover, three Training School have been speciﬁcally designed to build
the capacity of PhD students and young scholars. Dissemination has been con-
ducted also via the Action Website http://www.gecomplexity-cost.eu and a Dis-
cussion Paper Series edited by COST Members and indexed in REPEC.
This book gives a concise account of the most relevant scientiﬁc results of
the GeComplexity Cost Action and points at open issues to be addressed in
future projects. The Volume is divided into three parts reﬂecting the diﬀerent
perspectives under which complex spatial economic systems have been studied.
2 The Macro Perspective - Economic Geography
The chapter by Commendatore, Hammer, Kubin and Petraglia provides
a non-technical overview of new economic geography models dealing with policy
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issues. The Chapter begins by describing the main ingredients of the NEG app-
roach and illustrating the basic mechanism at work centred on the interplay of
agglomeration and dispersion forces. As suggested by Krugman (1991), trade
integration leads to spatial concentration of economic activity altering the bal-
ance in favour of the agglomeration forces. The authors consider various policy
measures including alternative categories of public expenditure, international tax
competition, unilateral actions of protection/liberalisation, and trade agreements.
The implications of public intervention in two-region NEG models are discussed
by unfolding the impact of policy measures on agglomeration/dispersion forces.
Results are described and contrasted to those obtained in standard non-NEG the-
oretical models. Paradigmatic examples are the non-neutrality of home-bias pub-
lic procurement for the determination of a country’s pattern of specialization; the
presence of taxable agglomeration rents leading to a “race to the top” rather than a
“race to the bottom”within a tax competition game between countries; the impos-
sibility to exploit a potential comparative advantage to avoid deindustrialization
in poorer countries when agglomeration eﬀects are at work.
The high degree of abstraction limits the applicability of NEG models to real
world policy issues. The authors discuss in some detail two extensions of NEG
models to reduce this applicability gap: the cases of multi-regional frameworks
and ﬁrm heterogeneity.
The applicability gap is addressed by Commendatore, Kubin and
Sushko by studying a three-region economy in a NEG model. By using lin-
ear (and not iso-elastic) demand functions, the model is able to account for
trade patterns between pairs of regions allowing for unilateral, bilateral and no
trade regimes. Thus, the proposed framework is suitable to study how changes
in parameters that are typical for NEG models, such as trade costs and regional
market size, not only shape the regional distribution of economic activity, but
also at the same time determine the emergence of trade links between regions.
To focus the analysis, the authors study in more detail three speciﬁc trade
patterns frequently found in the EU trade network. First, they consider three
autarkic regions belonging to an economy at its ﬁrst stages of development. For
this set-up, instances of coexisting stable long-run equilibria (multi-stability) are
found, which cannot occur in a two-region framework, stressing the importance
of initial advantage in the process of industry concentration; then following the
improvement of transport infrastructures between two regions, the possibility
that these regions trade with each other (but only with each other) is introduced.
As trade costs fall, the region with a larger initial endowment of the mobile factor
starts exporting to the closer region and attracts the industrial sector. However,
in contrast to the two-region case, some of the industry locates in the more
remote region, ﬁnding shelter from competition; and, ﬁnally, even the remote
region closes its distance with one of the other two regions, which increases its
centrality in the trade network. However, centrality does not necessarily translate
into a locational advantage.
More generally, the authors ﬁnd a surprising plethora of long-run equilibria
each involving a speciﬁc regional distribution of economic activity and a spe-
ciﬁc pattern of trade links. This implies that a variation in trade costs shapes
simultaneously industry location and the conﬁguration of the trade network.
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Basile and Mı´nguez propose a critical review of parametric and semi-
parametric spatial econometric models. They focus on the capability of each
class of models to ﬁt the main features of spatial data, namely spatial depen-
dence (or weak cross sectional dependence, due to spatial spillover eﬀects),
strong cross-sectional dependence (due to unobserved common factors), spatial
heterogeneity, nonlinearities, and time persistence. They also provide a brief dis-
cussion of the existent software developed to estimate most of the econometric
models described in the chapter.
They start by summarizing the broad literature on parametric spatial autore-
gressive models, which is still the dominant paradigm in spatial econometrics.
Within this literature, it is possible to distinguish between ﬁrst-generation spa-
tial econometric models (essentially developed to handle cross-sectional data)
which focus on modeling spatial dependence through diﬀerent alternative lin-
ear speciﬁcations, and second-generation spatial econometric models, developed
during the last decade, more speciﬁcally, static and dynamic spatial panel data
models which prove to be particularly useful to control for unobserved spatial
heterogeneity and time persistence. A natural extension of the last class of mod-
els, proposed during the last few years, consists of the combination of spatial
panel data models and common factor models in order to disentangle strong and
weak (spatial) cross-section dependence.
In spite of these important advances in the literature, it is important to
recognize that any parametric model is limited to speciﬁc forms of spatial vari-
ation of the parameters, while they are not able to capture more general forms
of model mis-speciﬁcations, such as spatial parameter heterogeneity and non-
linearities. Thus, semiparametric spatial econometric models appear as more
ﬂexible estimation frameworks. The authors dedicate the second part of their
Chapter to this category of models, distinguishing between (mixed)-GWR mod-
els based on kernel methods, and models based on penalized spline smoothers.
Three recent contributions are of particular relevance in this context. First, com-
bining kernel smoothing methods and standard spatial lag models, a new class of
data generating processes (DGP) within the GWR literature (Mixed Geograph-
ically Weighted Regression Simultaneous AutoRegressive Models) provides an
important framework to account for both spatial dependence and nonstation-
arity of the parameters. Second, combining penalized regression spline methods
with standard cross-section spatial autoregressive models, another class of DGP
allows the researchers to simultaneously control for spatial spillover eﬀects, non-
linearities, spatially autocorrelated unobserved heterogeneity, and spatial non-
stationarity of the parameters. Finally, semiparametric models for longitudinal
data, which include a non-parametric spatio-temporal trend, a spatial lag of
the dependent variable, and a time series autoregressive noise, represent a valid
alternative to parametric methods aimed at disentangling strong and weak cross-
sectional dependence. Natural directions in which these methods can be extended
are speciﬁcations suitable for the analysis of dynamic frameworks.
The last chapter by Commendatore and Kubin concludes Part I of the
Volume. The authors summarise the work carried out during the lifetime of the
Action by the Working Group whose main task was to build multiregional NEG
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models. The authors list the main results, point at the questions left open and
suggest topics for future research. What emerges from the discussion is that the
predictions of NEG models are highly sensitive to their speciﬁcation: diﬀerent
assumptions concerning, for example, the geographical structure of the economy
or even the functional form of consumer’s preferences lead to diﬀerent long-run
spatial distributions.
3 The Meso Perpective - Financial Markets
Bougheas, Harvey andKirman explore the relationship between systemic risk
and the behavior of aggregate credit. The two most severe macroeconomic crises
of the last 100 years, namely, the Great Depression of the 1930s and the Great
Recession that commenced at the close of the ﬁrst decade of the current century,
were preceded by extreme events in ﬁnancial markets in general and the banking
system in particular. In a recent study, Schularick and Taylor (2012) have empir-
ically identiﬁed a historical link between the level of aggregate credit in the econ-
omy and macroeconomic performance. They argue that aggregate credit can be a
powerful predictor of economic crises, especially, rare catastrophic events.
Their aim is to provide a microfoundational explanation for the above rela-
tionship. In this work the focus in on the behavior of aggregate credit. In partic-
ular, the authors analyze the dynamics of aggregate bank credit in an economy
where all ﬁnancial transactions are intermediated through the banking system.
Viewing the ﬁnancial system as a network of banks that are connected through
their ﬁnancial obligations to each other, they examine how the impact of shocks
on the asset side of the banking balance sheets may disrupt the supply of aggre-
gate credit.
In their model, banks are unable to completely diversify their loan portfolios
and thus they can become insolvent. This will be the case when the total loan
repayments (from both entrepreneurs and other banks) are insuﬃcient to cover
their obligations to their depositors and other banks. In order to clear the bank-
ing system when some banks become insolvent the authors apply the method
suggested by Eisenberg and Noe (2001). Insolvencies can propagate through the
banking network. When one bank is unable to meet its obligations to another
bank, the latter bank might itself become insolvent even if it would have remained
solvent had its loans to the originally failed bank been repaid. The bankruptcy
resolution process terminated when there are no insolvent banks left. The num-
ber of bank failures will depend on (a) the distribution of initial losses across the
banking system, and (b) the structure of the ﬁnancial network (see, for example,
Acemoglu et al. 2015).
As long as the liquidation of assets held by insolvent institutions does not
depress the market values of these assets the total systemic losses by the end
of the resolution process will be equal to the initial losses due to the inability
of entrepreneurs to repay their loans. However, as Shleifer and Vishny (1992)
have argued during systemic episodes, exactly because there are many failing
institutions, the market value (liquidation value) of the assets can drop below
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their corresponding book values (ﬁre sales). This drop in asset prices forces other
institutions to reevaluate their own assets thus potentially causing new rounds
of failures.
In the model, when the authors do not allow for ﬁre sales, the value of
aggregate credit provided by the banking network follows a random walk. This
is because the capacity of the banking network to provide credit each period
depends on the availability of reserves which in turn depends on the performance
of aggregate loans the period before. Given that shocks are normally distributed
each period it follows that aggregate lending activity follows a random walk.
When they introduce ﬁre sales, systemic losses can be much greater than initial
losses thus introducing fat tails on the lower end of the distribution of aggregate
credit. Under the supposition that aggregate credit is positively correlated with
aggregate output their approach might be useful for explaining two features of
business cycles: (a) the asymmetry in booms and busts (Acemoglu and Scott
1991), and (b) macroeconomic fat tails Acemoglu et al. 2017).
The chapter by Schmitt, Tuinstra and Westerhoﬀ reviews the literature
on market interactions and policy measures. In the wake of the ﬁnancial crisis
that hit the global economy almost ten years ago many economists and pol-
icy makers realized that the strong links between individual markets played an
important role in allowing the crisis to spread globally, or may even have been
at the core of the emergence of the crisis. This has spawned a literature that
deals both with the eﬀect that interactions between markets have on market
stability, and with the policy measures that may be implemented to counter the
instabilities that potentially arise from these interactions. In this chapter, the
authors review a small part of that literature.
That individual markets may lead to instability has been recognized for
some time already. Classic textbook examples are the cobweb model under na¨ıve
expectations (see Ezekiel 1938) or the Cournot oligopoly model under best reply
dynamics (see Theocharis 1959). More recently the development of the theory of
nonlinear dynamical systems has led to an increased attention for the possibil-
ity of market instability. Some early and important applications of this theory
are Grandmont (1985) and Bullard (1994) on overlapping generations models,
Chiarella (1998), Hommes (1994) and Brock and Hommes (1997) on cobweb mar-
kets, Day and Huang (1990), Lux (1995) and Brock and Hommes (1998) on ﬁnan-
cial markets and Puu (1991) and Kopel (1996) on Cournot duopoly models. Lab-
oratory experiments with paid human subjects suggest that instability is indeed
likely to occur in some of these market environments (see e.g. Hommes, Sonne-
mans, Tuinstra and van de Velden, 2005 and Heemeijer, Hommes, Sonnemans
and Tuinstra 2009).
In the last decade, the interaction between markets has been identiﬁed as
an additional route to market instability. Dieci and Westerhoﬀ (2009, 2010), for
example, ﬁnd that two stable cobweb markets may become unstable when they
are linked. Tuinstra, Wegener and Westerhoﬀ (2014) show that this increased
instability may result in counterintuitive policy prescriptions: increasing import
tariﬀs between interacting markets may decrease allocative eﬃciency at the
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steady state equilibrium, but may be welfare enhancing nevertheless. This is
because they weaken the link between markets and thereby stabilize consump-
tion and production patterns. Even in the absence of na¨ıve price expectations and
cobweb dynamics linking two markets may lead to instability, as demonstrated
by Schmitt, Tuinstra and Westerhoﬀ (2017a, 2017b). They study a stylized model
of market interaction, where ﬁrms may migrate between two regions on the basis
of proﬁtability between these regions. If ﬁrms are suﬃciently sensitive to these
proﬁt diﬀerences this may lead to unstable dynamics. Following the insights
from Schmitt and Westerhoﬀ (2015, 2017), the papers by Schmitt, Tuinstra and
Westerhoﬀ (2017a, 2017b) investigate how the introduction of proﬁt taxes may
dampen the proﬁt diﬀerences between the two markets and thereby stabilize
the dynamics. Schmitt, Tuinstra and Westerhoﬀ (2017b) discuss the scenario
where each region is overseen by an independent local government or regulatory
authority. Optimally, these two regulators coordinate their proﬁt taxes in such a
way that markets are stable and total welfare is maximized. However, Schmitt,
Tuinstra and Westerhoﬀ (2017b) argue that, if regulators are only (or mainly)
interested in welfare in their own region, each of them will may have the incentive
to decrease the proﬁt tax, which can destabilizes markets.
The last chapter of Part II by Bougheas and Kirman oﬀers a number of
suggestions for future research, ﬁrst, for exploring the link between the network
structure of the banking system and aggregate credit and, second, the relation-
ship between systemic risk in ﬁnancial markets and macroeconomic fat tails.
4 The Micro Perspective - Strategic Decisions
and Interactions
Colombo and Dawid oﬀer an innovative approach to the issue of location
decisions and R&D spillovers and provides ample opportunity for further devel-
opments. The authors assume that ﬁrms are forward looking and base their loca-
tion decisions on sophisticated (Markov) strategies that determine their R&D
investments. In particular, the authors consider a diﬀerential game based on a
standard Cournot model with three ﬁrms. Firms 2 and 3 are located in an indus-
trial cluster and at t = 0, ﬁrm 1 has the choice to either co-locate in the cluster
or instead locate in isolation. The diﬀerence between these two choices is that
each ﬁrm in the cluster receives knowledge spillovers from all the other ﬁrms in
the cluster whereas if located in isolation, ﬁrm 1 receives no spillovers but also
does not need to worry about outgoing spillovers. The ﬁrms choose production
quantities and their R&D investments that increase their knowledge stocks. In
the model, absorptive capacity plays a crucial role: a ﬁrm’s current knowledge
stock determines its absorptive capacity which, in turn, determines how much
of incoming spillovers the ﬁrm can absorb to increase its own knowledge stock.
The ﬁrms located in the cluster face ﬁxed costs of congestion each period and all
ﬁrms try to maximize their discounted proﬁts. The authors characterize Markov-
Perfect Equilibria of this game for various scenarios. One of their insight is that
the relation between ﬁrm 1’s location choice and ﬁrm 1’s initial knowledge stock
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depends on the characteristics of absorptive capacity (exogenous and constant
versus endogenous and proportional to knowledge stock). In case of a constant
absorptive capacity, ﬁrm 1 prefers to locate in the cluster if its initial knowledge
stock is small. However, if absorptive capacity is endogenous, then ﬁrm 1 locates
in the cluster if its initial knowledge stock is large. As a consequence, the authors
conclude that a deeper understanding of ﬁrms’ location decisions requires a thor-
ough investigation of the associated characteristics of the spillover mechanisms.
The chapter by Kopel, Manasakis, and Petrakis studies competition
between a local ﬁrm that invests in corporate social responsibility (CSR) and
a multinational ﬁrm that enters the foreign market either via exports or for-
eign direct investments. As a modeling framework the authors use a multi-stage
game which is more standard in the International Business literature. In stage
1, the government of the foreign country sets the tariﬀ; in stage 2, the multina-
tional home ﬁrm decides whether to serve the foreign country’s market through
exports or FDI; ﬁnally, in stage 3, the local ﬁrm invests in CSR and the two ﬁrms
set their quantities for the markets. The game is solved by backward induction
and the solution concept is Subgame Perfect Nash. The authors derive results
on the interaction between the optimal mode of entry of the (multinational)
enterprise and the local ﬁrm’s investment in CSR. They further look at the
eﬀects on consumer welfare, ﬁrm proﬁts, and total welfare. This paper brings
together two important topics, namely the role of multinational enterprises in
globalized markets and the impact of ﬁrms’ corporate social responsibility. With
the introduction of Directive 2014/95/EU on the disclosure of non-ﬁnancial and
diversity information, the European Commission expressed its view on CSR as
an extended corporate governance policy. The Directive introduces enhanced
reporting requirements on social, environmental and governance issues. During
the process of the development of Directive 2014/95/EU, concerns were raised
that due to this regulation European ﬁrms will have a competitive disadvan-
tage against their international rivals. An important issue is, therefore, if CSR
enhances or diminishes the competitiveness of European ﬁrms against their inter-
national rivals. This is particularly crucial, since the ﬁeld of international trade
and CSR policies is still under-researched (e.g. Kitzmuller and Shimshack 2012).
Bischi, Kopel, Lamantia, and Radi work within an evolutionary setting
which is rarely used in the literature on location decisions of multinational ﬁrms.
The authors study a population of ﬁrms that can either manufacture in their
home country or oﬀ-shore production to a foreign country. The two locations are
structurally diﬀerent as the home country has higher unit production costs but
higher internal knowledge spillovers whereas the foreign country has lower unit
costs but also smaller internal knowledge spillovers. Additionally, (i) technology
know-how developed in one country can potentially be transferred to the other
country and be used for reducing costs, and (ii) ﬁrms located in the foreign
country face congestion costs that are increasing in the manufacturing activity
occurring in this country. The ﬁrms’ location decisions are based on a simple
(myopic) comparison of unit production costs taking into account current within-
country spillovers, cross-border spillovers, and congestion costs. An evolutionary
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choice mechanism based on an exponential replicator equation determines the
share of ﬁrms that switch from one location to the other. From a modeling
point of view, this chapter diﬀers from the approaches taken in the previous
two chapters of this section of the book since location strategies are spread in a
population of ﬁrms via an evolutionary mechanism that captures some myopic
decision rule instead of forward-looking rational decision calculus. The authors
present a variety of scenarios and characterize long run location patterns for
oﬀ-shoring and on-shoring and how these activities depend on spillovers and
congestion costs. Such a framework can be used to generate robust predictions
which can then be tested empirically.
Lastly, Bischi and Kopel brieﬂy reviews the research activity carried out
by the Working Group on ‘Social and Industrial Interactions’. The main focus
of this group has been on the behaviour of economic agents at the micro-level.
Concerning ﬁrms locational choices, and especially referring to multinationals,
the authors notice that the trend that has lead many ﬁrms to oﬀ-shoring their
main activities is, recently, reversing. Moreover, the authors stress that environ-
mental, social and governance dimensions are becoming more and more relevant
issues. Finally, they suggest as main avenues for future research the study on
corporate social responsibility strategies of multinational enterprises and their
global value chains.
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